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PLAIN MEANING IN THE 
LAW OF PROPERTY 
A SOCRATIC DIALOGUE 
John V. Orth† 
CENE: A classroom in a modern American law school. The 
school is neither at the top nor the bottom of the law school 
rankings. The room is well lit and has a white-board in front 
and plain white walls with high windows across the back. 
Student desks rise, row on row, to the rear. There is a raised plat-
form in the front with a desk and podium. At the podium stands a 
young professor, aged about 35. He is just short of six feet tall, 
clean-shaven with dark hair and eyes. He is neatly but casually 
dressed in tan slacks and white shirt. His shirt collar is open and the 
knot of an undistinguished tie hangs about 4 inches below. He is 
addressing a class of about 40 students, although the room would 
seat two or three times that number. 
Professor: Today we’re going to have a brief discussion about trust 
construction, that is, the interpretation of the terms of a trust in-
strument, before we go on to consider the effect of inherited wealth 
on our society. Although we’ll be talking about a trust, the lessons 
could apply to the interpretation of wills – or any other document, 
for that matter. Now, in the old days you would have been assigned 
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a case to read, and we would have spent half the class working 
through the facts before we even got to the law. To save time, I’ve 
just cut the key paragraphs out of a recent Utah case, Banks v. 
Means,1 and posted them on-line. You should have read them as part 
of today’s assignment, and we can all look at them together on the 
screen: 
Projected on the screen behind the professor appears the following text: 
BETTY A. BANKS FAMILY TRUST 
Article I, entitled PURPOSES, declares “This Trust is estab-
lished for the primary benefit of the Undersigned during the 
Undersigned’s lifetime, and for the Undersigned’s family 
thereafter.” The document then names Ms. Banks’ family as 
Kenneth Alan Banks, Susan Banks Baker, and Bransford Mi-
chael Banks. Article IV, DISPOSITION ON THE DEATH 
OF THE UNDERSIGNED, designates the Banks children as 
joint beneficiaries of the trust estate upon Ms. Banks’ death. 
Article VI, TRUSTEE PROVISIONS, names the Banks chil-
dren as joint successor trustees. The trust agreement pro-
vides that the trust is revocable, and that Ms. Banks, as set-
tlor, can amend certain portions of the trust, subject to the 
provisions of the trust language. 
Article III, entitled AMENDMENT, REVOCATION AND 
ADDITIONS TO TRUST, provides: 
3.1 Rights of the Undersigned. As long as the Undersigned 
is alive, the Undersigned reserves the right to amend, modi-
fy or revoke this Trust in whole or in part, including the 
principal, and the present or past undisbursed income from 
such principal. Such revocation or amendment of this Trust 
may be in whole or in part by written instrument. Amend-
ment, modification or revocation of this instrument shall be 
effective only when such change is delivered in writing to 
the then acting Trustee. On the revocation of this instru-
ment in its entirety, the Trustee shall deliver to the Under-
signed, as the Undersigned may direct in the instrument of 
revocation, all of the Trust property. 
                                                                                                 
1 52 P.3d 1190 (Utah 2002).  
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3.2 Interests of the Beneficiaries. The interests of the bene-
ficiaries are presently vested interests subject to divestment 
which shall continue until this Trust is revoked or terminat-
ed other than by death. As long as this Trust subsists, the 
Trust properties and all the rights and privileges hereunder 
shall be controlled and exercised by the Trustees named 
herein in their fiduciary capacity. 
Prof.: Before we get to the construction problem, let’s just get 
the big picture. The “undersigned,” by the way, is the settlor of the 
trust, Betty A. Banks. This is a revocable inter vivos trust. Will 
someone please tell us what it means to be an inter vivos trust? 
Student 1, an intense looking young woman with dark hair and eyes: It 
means the settlor, in this case Betty Banks, created the trust during 
her life. 
Prof.: Well, when else could a person create a trust, if not while 
they’re alive? 
S.1: At death – in their will. Then it would be a testamentary 
trust. 
Prof.: Yes. Good. And the “revocable” part? 
S.1: This trust can be revoked by Betty. 
Prof.: And after her death? 
S.1: Once Betty is dead, I guess her trust becomes irrevocable. 
Prof.: Right. And who is the present beneficiary of this trust? 
S.1: Betty. It says it’s for her primary benefit during her lifetime. 
Prof.: Yes. And can you tell me who the trustee is? 
S.1, after a brief pause: It doesn’t say. 
Prof.: No, it doesn’t. Would the trust fail if no trustee was 
named? 
S.1: No. “No trust fails for want of a trustee.” A court would ap-
point one, if necessary. 
Prof. Right. I’m guessing this trust actually does name someone – 
probably it’s somewhere else in the court’s opinion. Can you guess 
who was named trustee? 
S.1: Probably Betty. 
Prof.: That’s my guess, too. I would guess that Betty, the settlor, 
who is the lifetime beneficiary, is also the trustee. 
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Student 2, a confused looking young man with dark hair and glasses: 
Professor! 
Prof.: Yes. 
S.2: How can the same person be the trustee and the beneficiary? 
I mean, how can one person be holding property for his own bene-
fit? That sounds like ownership to me. 
Prof., patiently: We talked about this last week. If there was no 
other beneficiary, you would be right: the legal and equitable estates 
would merge and the trust would terminate. But in this case there is 
another beneficiary or beneficiaries. And who is that? 
S.1 again: Betty’s children. 
Prof.: Right. 
S.2 again: Professor! 
Prof.: What is it? 
S.2: The trust says any change in terms must be delivered in 
writing to the trustee. Does that mean she has to write a letter to 
herself? 
Prof.: Yes, it would, if she is the trustee. That’s not quite as 
strange as it sounds. It’s often the case that trust instruments require 
that amendments have to be in writing and delivered to the trustee, 
and the wording is often carried over into self-settled trusts. You 
certainly want a written record if any changes were made. And if 
the writing is in the settlor’s possession, it means they intended it. 
Okay, moving on . . ., I’m going to put up the change Betty made a 
few years later. I assume it was in writing and “delivered” to her – 
that is, her lawyer drafted it and she signed it and kept it with the 
original document. 
Projected on the wall behind the Professor now appears the following 
text: 
Article IV, DISPOSITION ON THE DEATH OF THE 
UNDERSIGNED, now designates Ms. Banks’ sister, Nancy 
A. Means, as sole beneficiary of the trust estate upon Ms. 
Banks’ death, and Article VI, TRUSTEE PROVISIONS, 
names Nancy A. Means as sole successor trustee. 
Prof.: By the way, the reference to a successor trustee suggests 
that Betty was the original trustee. At her death a successor trustee 
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takes over. Remember that it’s handy to name the remainder bene-
ficiary as the successor trustee. She did that when her kids were the 
remainder beneficiaries, and when she substituted her sister Nancy, 
she named Nancy successor trustee too. Anyway . . ., you can prob-
ably guess what happened next since this is the “course in unhappy 
families.” We’ve seen children suing parents, brothers suing sisters, 
and so forth. Betty died and the Banks kids sued their Aunt Nancy. 
What you might not have been able to guess is that the Utah Su-
preme Court ruled in favor of the kids! Can anyone see how that 
was possible? 
Silence. 
Prof.: Well, I’ll tell you. Look back at the trust terms. See where 
it says under 3.2 Interests of the Beneficiaries, “The interests of the 
beneficiaries are presently vested interests subject to divestment 
which shall continue until this Trust is revoked.” Believe it or not, 
the learned judges said: Well, Betty never revoked the trust, she 
only amended it. So the kids’ interests were never divested and they 
win! 
A student has raised his hand.  
Professor, irritated at the interruption: Did you want to ask a ques-
tion? 
Student 3, a balding older student with a bookish air: Yes, sir. What 
does it mean when it says “revoked or terminated other than by 
death”? 
Prof. sharply: Where does it say that? 
S.3: At the end of the sentence you just read: “The interests of 
the beneficiaries are presently vested interests subject to divestment 
which shall continue until this Trust is revoked or terminated other 
than by death.” 
Prof.: Oh, yeah. Well, it’s obvious, isn’t it? At Betty’s death, the 
trust will terminate because the beneficiary will get everything. So, 
that sentence just means that the trust continues until it is revoked 
or terminated by Betty – or until Betty dies. 
S.3, puzzled: But if the trust terminates at Betty’s death, why 
does she name a successor trustee? 
Prof., somewhat hurriedly: Just to make things easier. We just 
John V. Orth 
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talked about that. The only thing the successor trustee will do is 
transfer legal title to the beneficiary – in this case, herself. 
Now . . ., back to where we were: the court’s reasoning, such as it 
is. The justices thought because Betty never revoked or terminated 
her trust, the kids’ interest remained vested. All Betty did was 
amend the trust! Believe it or not, judges used to do things like that 
all the time, and a few of them still do. The instrument says she had 
to revoke or terminate the trust in order to change the beneficiaries 
and all she did was amend it! That’s the so-called “plain meaning 
rule.” If a trust instrument has a so-called plain meaning, then the 
judges will apply that, even if there is good evidence that the settlor 
intended something else. You can see why it’s not called the plain 
intention rule! Betty’s intention is plain as day. She changed her 
mind and wanted her sister to take her property instead of her kids. 
She said that plainly enough. Nowadays we’ve abandoned the old 
literal approach in favor of simply doing the right thing . . . . Oh, 
and one other thing, that bit about the kids’ interest in the trust be-
ing “vested subject to divestment” needs to be taken with a big grain 
of salt today. Originally, it was inserted to show that a “present in-
terest” passed, even if it was subject to divestment, in order to show 
that the trust wasn’t a will, which would need two witnesses. Now-
adays we recognize that an inter vivos trust really operates just like a 
will – or, as we usually say, a “will substitute” – even though it 
doesn’t need to be executed with all the formalities of a will. What 
sense does it make anyway to say that the beneficiaries’ interest is 
vested when it can be divested at the whim of the settlor? The bene-
ficiaries’ interest in a revocable inter vivos trust is really just like the 
interest of a person named in a will while the testator is still alive 
and able to change it. One modern court that “gets it” put it this 
way: a beneficiary’s interest in a revocable inter vivos trust is “con-
tingent at most,”2 which means it isn’t much of an interest at all, 
pretty much like an “expectancy” under a will. All right, class, the 
take-away lesson is that today we interpret documents to let people 
do what they want with their own property, to give effect to plainly 
                                                                                                 
2 Linthicum v. Rudi, 148 P.3d 746 (Nev. 2006).  
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expressed intention, and not to let a literal reading get in the way. 
This should be so obvious that I wouldn’t take class time on it, ex-
cept you need to be aware of how the old “plain meaning rule” 
could defeat intention. Oh . . ., and also notice what a crummy job 
Betty’s lawyer did as well. There was no need for a simple change 
like this to require litigation all the way to the state supreme court. 
If she wanted to stick with the vested-interest bit, all she needed to 
say was that the interest continued until the trust was revoked or 
terminated or amended. Now, for the rest of the hour . . . . 
A student’s hand is raised, and the Professor, impatient at the interrup-
tion: Did you have a question? 
Student 4, a young man with short blond hair and a gold earring in his 
left ear: I’m not convinced that the result was wrong. 
Prof., sharply: Why not? 
S.4: Well, first, the judges are right about what the trust instru-
ment says. Just read the words. Betty didn’t revoke or terminate 
her trust. And she never changed the first article which says that the 
trust is for the primary benefit of herself for life and then for her 
family, defined as her kids. And it says that the kids’ interests are 
vested until the trust is revoked or terminated. I was reminded of 
the case you mentioned the other day about the old woman who 
was so harassed by her greedy kids that she made a new will leaving 
everything to them and then, while they watched, she burned up a 
will – only it wasn’t the old will, it was the new one. She seemed to 
know just what she was doing. And it bought her peace and quiet 
until her death, when the truth came out. I think you said something 
like: “The old woman fooled them all.” 
Prof., hurriedly: Yes, you’re right about that. That was the Heibut 
Case.3 We were talking about revocation and revival of wills. 
Prof., continuing after a pause: And since you brought it up, I guess 
we’ll have to take a few minutes for a quick review. In some states, 
like the state where Heibut arose, revocation of a new will brings 
back, “revives,” the last will. Remember, that’s not true in all states, 
so the old lady got lucky. When she burned the new will, the old 
                                                                                                 
3 Estate of Heibut, 653 N.W.2d 101 (S.D. 2002).  
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will came back to life. But you don’t seriously think Betty “amend-
ed” her trust in favor of her sister, knowing it would not in fact 
work, do you? 
S.4: We don’t know what she really wanted or knew. All we 
know is what the trust says. 
Prof.: Yes, okay. But it seems too far-fetched to me. Well, let’s 
go on. 
S.4 raises his hand again. 
Prof.: What? 
S.4: Well, I went and read the case, and it got me thinking. 
Prof., with mild sarcasm: That’s good. 
Laughter. 
S.4, undeterred: This case included an undue influence claim and a 
claim of lack of capacity. Betty changed the trust only a few weeks 
before she died. And Nancy, her sister, was described as Betty’s 
older sister. I was wondering if Nancy had recently moved in with 
Betty, who was probably a widow, and talked her into changing the 
trust right before she died. Maybe Nancy got greedy. Or maybe she 
was just an old woman who was afraid of running out of money. 
Prof.: Well, so what? I mean, the court must have dismissed the 
undue influence and lack of capacity claims – or they wouldn’t have 
gotten to the construction question. 
S.4: No, they didn’t dismiss them, they just said they didn’t need 
to decide them. The judges might have thought that there was a real 
chance that there had been undue influence, or that Betty was really 
unable to know what she was doing. And another thing: Nancy was 
determined to keep Betty’s lawyer from giving evidence. That 
seemed pretty suspicious to me. Maybe the judges thought it would 
be too messy to go into all that – you know, the nephews and nieces 
calling their Aunt Nancy a liar. By deciding the case the way they 
did, they could avoid that – and give the property to the kids. 
Prof.: But that’s what not what Betty really wanted. 
S.4: We don’t know what she really wanted. We only know 
what she really said. 
After a pause, the Professor, in a determined tone: Well, we only have 
a few minutes left, but we can at least begin to get to the policy dis-
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cussion . . . . 
S.4, interrupting: May I ask one more question? 
Prof., resigned: You may as well. We’re almost out of time any-
way. 
S.4: If Aunt Nancy had won this case, what would have happened 
to the property when she died? After all, she was older than Betty, 
who had three grown children, so Nancy couldn’t have too long to 
live herself. 
Prof.: Obviously the trust property would have been Nancy’s to 
dispose of as she saw fit. 
S.4: So, she could have left it to her kids, if she had any. Or to a 
friend, or a charity. Or, whatever. 
Prof.: Of course. But I don’t know how any of that matters. If 
Betty wanted Nancy to have everything, then Nancy should have 
gotten everything, and then she could have done whatever she 
wanted with it. 
S.4: Yes, but maybe the judges thought Betty would have pre-
ferred her kids to get her property after Nancy. 
Prof.: Well, if that’s what she wanted, she should have said that. 
She didn’t say “to Nancy for life, then to my kids.” She just said “to 
Nancy.” Anyway, we can’t try to guess what the judges really 
thought. We can only go by what they said. 
S.4: That’s just the point. Maybe we should just go by what Betty 
said, and not try to guess what she thought. 
An awkward silence is broken by the bell, and the students begin noisily 
closing their laptops and pushing back their chairs. 
Over the noise, the Professor shouts: Well, we’ve run out of time. 
We’ll have to try to catch up tomorrow. 
 
 
 
 
